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THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED
PERSONS ACT: AN ANALYSIS UNDER THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE
Evan M. Shapiro
Abstract: Congress based the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) on accumulated evidence suggesting that the land use decisions of local
governments unfairly burden religious uses. The RLUIPA is narrower in scope than two
previous statutes aimed at protecting religious liberty. The United States Supreme Court held
the first of these religious liberty statutes unconstitutional, and Congress failed to enact the
other. This Comment examines the constitutionality of the RLUIPA under the Commerce
Clause and argues that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority because (1) land
use regulation does not constitute "economic activity" as defined by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison and (2) land use
regulation is insufficiently connected to interstate commerce.
Congress has recognized that religious institutions are often overly
burdened by local land use decisions. For example, a local ordinance
might limit the size of houses of worship in commercial or residential
zones.' Congress determined that such zoning laws often facially
discriminate against religion, and that zoning boards may apply neutral
zoning laws discriminatorily.' As a remedy, Congress passed the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), in part,
to protect religious institutions from local governments' land use
decisions.3 The RLUIPA prohibits local governments from substantially
burdening religion with their land use determinations unless the local
regulation furthers a compelling government interest and is the least
restrictive means to accomplish that interest.4
Congress's authority to enact legislation is limited and must be based
on a constitutionally granted power.5 Congress based its authority to
1. See Eric Pryne, Fimia Crafting Own Plan To Limit Rural Churches, SEATTLE TIMES, June 2,
2001, atB1.
2. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 18-24 (1999).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-5 (2000). The RLUIPA also protects institutionalized persons' right
to freely exercise their religion. See id. However, this Comment discusses only the land use portion
of the law.
4. Id. § 2000cc(a)(1).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,552 (1995) (quoting The Federalist No. 45, pp.
292-93 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)).
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enact the RLUIPA on several constitutional provisions,6 including the
Commerce Clause.7 The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to
regulate commerce among the states.8 Although the Supreme Court has
struck down previous legislation aimed at protecting religious liberty,9
the RLUIPA is much more limited in scope."
This Comment argues that Congress unconstitutionally exceeded its
Commerce Clause power by enacting the land use portion of the
RLUIPA." Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate those activities that are economic in nature and that substantially
affect interstate commerce."2 The regulated activity at issue in the
RLUIPA is land use regulation, which does not constitute "economic
activity" as recently defined by the Court. 3 When enacting the RLUIPA,
Congress additionally failed to satisfy the elements the Court has set
forth to ensure that the regulated activity has substantial effects on
interstate commerce.'
4
Part I of this Comment discusses the relationship between land use
and religion, and explains local governments' justifications for excluding
religious uses from certain zones. Part II details the provisions of the
RLUIPA, its legislative history, and previous statutes. Part II describes
the U.S. Supreme Court's past and current interpretations of Congress's
Commerce Clause power. Part IV argues that Congress exceeded its
authority in enacting the RLUIPA because land use regulation does not
6. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (exhibit 1).
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997).
10. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-5 (2000) (regulating only land use and institutionalized
persons) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a) (1994) (attempting to regulate any governmental activity
that substantially burdened the exercise of religion) and H.R 1691, 106th Cong. (1999) (aiming to
govern any substantial burden on a person's exercise of religion when that burden, or its removal,
affected commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian Tribes).
!I. Although this Comment contends that Congress did not have authority to enact the RLUIPA
under its Commerce Clause power, Congress supported the RLUIPA through other constitutional
powers such as the Spending Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 146 CONG.
REc. S7774 (exhibit 1). Thus, even if, as argued in this Comment, Congress unconstitutionally
exceeded its Commerce Clause powers, the statute may be deemed constitutional under these other
powers. However, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment.
12. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995).
13 See infra Part IV.A.
14. See infra Part IV.13
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relate to an economic endeavor or commercial transaction and is
insufficiently connected to interstate commerce.
I. LAND USE REGULATION AND RELIGION: THE NATURE
OF THE PROBLEM
Local governments historically have based their land use decisions on
considerations such as public safety, aesthetics, and economics."5
Religious uses often conflict with these concerns. In fact, courts have
often upheld local governments' justifications for excluding religious
uses in both residential and industrial zones.' 6 To prevent exclusion of
religious uses,'7 Congress promulgated the RLUIPA to regulate local
governments' land use determinations. 8
A. The Nature ofLand Use Regulation
The growth of land use regulation across the country was spurred by
concerns of public safety and aesthetics. In 1922, the United States
Department of Commerce promulgated the Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act (SZEA).' 9 The SZEA authorized municipalities to establish
zoning districts in which compatible uses are grouped together and
incompatible ones are excluded.20 Section Three of the SZEA sets out the
purposes of zoning: to ensure safety from fire and other dangers, provide
adequate air and light, lessen street congestion, promote health and
general welfare, regulate land use intensity and population density, and
15. See, eg., A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, American Law Institute, A Model Land
Development Code, Tentative Draft No. 1, at Appendix A, 210-21, at 212-15 (1968) [hereinafter
SZEA]; DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 4.15, at 108 (4th ed. 1997).
16. See, e.g., Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood,
699 F.2d 303, 308 (6th Cir. 1983); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654,
661-63 (D. Minn. 1990); Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293, 1297-99 (Alaska
1982); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of
Porterville, 203 P.2d 823, 825 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); City of Chi. Heights v. Living Word Outreach
Full Gospel Church and Ministries, Inc., 707 N.E.2d 53, 59 (II. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd in part, 749
N.E.2d 916, 932 (I1. 2001). Lutheran High Sch. Ass'n v. City of Farmington Hills, 381 N.W.2d 417,
419,421 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
17. 146 CONG. REc. S7774 (daily ed. July 27,2000) (exhibit 1).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000).
19. SZEA, supra note 15, at Appendix A, 210-21. All states follow the basic zoning principles
established in the SZEA. MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 4.15 at 108.
20. MANDELKER, supra note 15, at 108.
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acilitate public services. 2' Additionally, a local government should
regulate with reasonable consideration of the district's characteristics and
with the aim of preserving the value of buildings. 22
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the beneficial
purposes of zoning systems.2 3 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,24
the Court upheld segregation of residential, business, and industrial
uses.2" The Court expressed that the benefits of zoning include an
increase in the safety and security of home life, fewer street accidents
due to reduced traffic, lower noise levels in residential neighborhoods,
and a better environment in which to raise children.26
The Court continues to affirm the validity of zoning regulations based
on the rationale expressed in Euclid.17 For example, in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas,5 the Court upheld a zoning ordinance limiting the
occupancy of single-family houses to traditional families or to groups
including only two unrelated persons.29 The Court stated that government
may create zones for the purpose of providing families and youth with
secluded, clean areas of sanctuary.3"
B. Justifications for Land Use Regulation of Religious Uses
Courts have upheld local governments' decisions to exclude religious
uses from both residential and industrial zones.31 These cases illustrate
the nature and purpose of land use determinations. For residential areas,
zoning ordinances and decisions are often based on aesthetic, nuisance-
21. SZEA, supra note 15, at Appendix A, 214-15.
22. SZEA, supra note 15, at Appendix A, 215.
23. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-95 (1926).
24. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
25. See id. at 397; MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 2.40, at 56.
26. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394-95.
27. See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805, 816-17
(1984); Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9.
28. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
29. Id. at 8-10.
30. Id. at 9.
31. See supra note 16. Exclusion of religious uses from entire zones raises First Amendment
issues, a discussion of which is outside the scope of this Comment.
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type, and property-value concerns.32 In commercial and industrial areas,
economic considerations may impact zoning ordinances and decisions.33
1. Residential Areas
Reasons for excluding religious uses from residential zones mirror
some of the purposes of land use regulation expressed in the SZEA 4
Perceived detrimental effects of religious uses on municipal services,
property values, and traffic congestion often explain local governments'
decisions.35 In Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville,36 the California Court of Appeals
held that a land use ordinance excluding religious uses from residential
zones based on factors such as potential noise, traffic, and parking
problems constituted a proper exercise of a city's zoning power. 7
Likewise, the local government in Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of
Seward38 was justified in implementing an ordinance excluding religious
schools from residential zones based on concerns of excess traffic, noise,
and other nuisances.39
Local ordinances dedicated to preserving landmarks with historical or
architectural value also may conflict with religious uses. Historical
preservation laws prohibit demolition of historic buildings and require a
certain level of maintenance.40 The United States Supreme Court's recent
decisions indicate that historical preservation laws do not violate the Free
32. See, eg., Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood,
699 F.2d 303, 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1983); Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293,
1297-99 (Alaska 1982); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
City of Porterville, 203 P.2d 823, 825 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); Lutheran High Sch. Ass'n v. City of
Farnington Hills, 381 N.W.2d 417,419,421 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
33. See, e-g., Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 661 (D. Minn.
1990); City of Chi. Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church and Ministries, Inc., 707
N.E.2d 53,59 (Ill. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd in part, 749 N.E.2d 916,932 (111.2001).
34. See, e.g., Lakewood Congregation, 699 F.2d at 305, 308; Seward Chapel, 655 P.2d at 1297-
99; Porterville, 203 P.2d at 825; Lutheran High SchoolAss'n, 381 N.W.2d at419, 421.
35. MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 5.58, at 187.
36. 203 P.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1983).
37. Id. at 825.
38. 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982).
39. Id. at 1297-99.
40. MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 11.24, at 462.
1259
Washington Law Review
Exercise Clause.4 Courts have held that local governments are justified
both in excluding new churches from residential zones and in preventing
renovations of historical church buildings already located in such
zones.
42
2. Commercial and Industrial Zones
In industrial and commercial areas, safety and aesthetic concerns may
be secondary to economic considerations.43 For example, in City of
Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church and
Ministries, Inc.," the local government adopted a city ordinance that
required religious institutions to apply for a special use permit45 to locate
a house of worship in a commercial zone. 6 An Illinois Court of Appeals
accepted the city's rationale for adopting the ordinance, which was
intended to reinvigorate falling revenues and provide a stable tax base,
and denying the special use permit.47 The court stated that the city's
effort to designate certain areas for commercial activity encouraged
economic growth and stability.
41
41. See MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 11.35, at 471-72. Recently, the Court denied certiorari in
Rector, Wardens & Members of Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church. v. City of New York, 914 F.2d
348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991), where the issue was whether a New York City
ordinance could prevent a church from replacing a church-owned building with an office tower. Id.
at 350. The court of appeals held that the ordinance did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. Id. at 353-56. On the same day, the Supreme Court remanded a Washington State
Supreme Court decision that held that a historical landmark law interfered with the practice of
religion. First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 114 Wash.2d 392, 787 P.2d 1352
(Wash. 1990), vacated and remanded, 499 U.S. 901 (1990).
42. See supra notes 37, 39, 41 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 661 (D. Minn.
1990); City of Chi. Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church and Ministries, Inc., 707
N.E.2d 53, 59 (Il. App. 1999), rev'd in part, 749 N.E.2d 916, 932 (Il1. 2001) (holding that denial of
special use permit was improper because it conflicted with the zoning ordinance's legislative history
stating that churches are compatible with other uses in the commercial district).
44. 707 N.E.2d 53 (IlI. App. 1999).
45. A special use permit is necessary in situations in which a zoning ordinance authorizes a
particular use in a district only with the approval of a local zoning board or agency. DANIEL R.
MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 473 (4th ed. 1995).
46. City of Chicago Heights, 707 N.E.2d at 55.
47. Id. at 59. In addition to the ordinance's valid purpose of maintaining a stable economy within
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A Federal District Court in Minnesota upheld a similar ordinance in
Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings.4 9 The court validated an
ordinance because its purpose was to allow the city to develop the
downtown area commercially and set aside space for industrial uses,
while preserving the quality of the residential areas." These cases
illustrate that local governments' purposes for excluding religious uses
often include economic considerations as well as nuisance-type concerns.
C. Impact of Land Use Regulation on Religion
Local governments' land use regulations impact both the construction
of a religious facility in a zone and the use of a facility already located in
a zone.5 In addition, religious uses may conflict with lot and building
size regulations. This is particularly common when the religious
institution desires to build a "megachurch" or construct several.buildings
in one location. 2
Land use regulation may result in the outright exclusion of religious
uses from entire zones. 3 Although churches that have been in residential
communities prior to a zoning change would not be threatened by
outright removal, new churches often are unable to locate in residential
neighborhoods. 4 In most states, local governments may not exclude
churches from residential areas; however, at least one commentator has
asserted that the actual effect of land use regulation is much less
favorable than this general rule would suggest.55 Although most land use
cases relate to religious uses in residential zones, 56 more recent cases also
49. 740 F. Supp. 654 (D. Minn. 1990).
50. Id. at 661.
51. See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcommittee
on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 148 (1999) (statement of Marci
Hamilton, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law).
52. Id.
53. See H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 18-24 (1999); 146 CONG. REc. S7774-75 (daily ed. July 27,
2000) (exhibit 1).
54. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 18 (1999).
55. See Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 755,
763-64 (1999). "The actual experience of many churches is more in line with the hostile federal
cases than with the more encouraging summaries of state zoning doctrine.... Commentators writing
from the land use perspective share my sense that the climate has changed and that churches now
face less sympathetic regulation." Id. at 764 (internal citations omitted).
56. Id. at 763-64.
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have involved religious uses in industrial and commercial zones.5 7 It is
often a challenge to locate religious facilities in these zones as well.58
Local government action that results in the outright exclusion of
religious uses from a zone generally takes one of two forms: (1) the
zoning code on its face excludes religious uses from certain zones or (2)
zoning boards refuse to grant permits for religious uses.59 One expert
claims that zoning codes, by design, frequently treat religious uses less
favorably than secular uses.6" For example, a land use attorney's survey
of Chicago-area land use laws found evidence that Chicago's zoning
codes facially discriminate against religion.6 In several zoning codes,
there was no place a church could locate within a suburb without a
special use permit.
6
Furthermore, Congress has found evidence that zoning boards
discriminate in their application of facially neutral zoning laws.63 Land
use zoning boards have a significant amount of discretion in applying
zoning laws.6' Congress has explained that discrimination against
religious uses often "lurks behind such vague and universally applicable
reasons as traffic, aesthetics, or '[inconsistency] with the city's land use
plan. ' ' 65 The outright exclusion of religious uses from both residential
and commercial zones often is due to zoning codes that facially exclude
religious uses or a zoning board's application of neutral laws.66
57. Id. at 761.
58. See H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 18-19(1999).
59. See id. at 18-24; Laycock, supra note 55, at 764-65, 768, 773-74, 777-83; 146 CONG. REC.
S7774-75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (exhibit 1).
60. Laycock, supra note 55, at 776.
61. Laycock, supra note 55, at 773-74 (citing Compilation of Zoning Provisions Affecting
Churches in 29 Suburbs of Northern Cook County by John W. Mauck [as] of 7-10-98, Based Upon
1995 Published Standards, attached to statement of John Mauck, partner, Mauck, Ballande, Baker &
O'Connell, available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/mauck.pdo.
62. Laycock, supra note 55, at 773.
63. See H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 18; 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (exhibit 1).
64. Laycock, supra note 55, at 764-65.
65. 146 CONG. REc. S7774 (exhibit 1).
66. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
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II. RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Since 1993, Congress has considered three bills that attempted to
protect religious liberty. The first was the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),67 which the U.S. Supreme Court held
to be unconstitutional in 1997.68 The second, the Religious Liberty
Protection Act of 1999 (RLPA),69 failed to pass in the Senate in 1999.70
Finally, in 2000, Congress enacted the RLUIPA,7  which is narrower in
scope than the two previous acts, focusing only on local land use
regulation and institutionalized persons."
A. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Initial Attempt To
Restore Protection to Religion
Congress passed the RFRA7n in 1993 in response to the Court's
decision in Employment Division v. Smith,74 which held that generally
applicable laws that burdened religion were not subject to a strict
scrutiny standard.' Under a strict scrutiny standard, a government would
be required to show a "compelling governmental interest" to justify
zoning decisions that negatively impact religious uses.76 The RFRA was
enacted to restore protection to religion by requiring that governments
refrain from substantially burdening religion absent a compelling state
interest.77 The U.S. Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores73 struck
down the RFRA, at least as it applied to state and local governments,79 by
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1994).
68. See City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
69. H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (lst Sess. 1999).
70. Id.; 146 CONG. REC. S7778 (daily ed. July 27,2000) (statement of Sen. Reid).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-5 (2000).
72. See supra, note 10.
73. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(a)(4) (1994).
74. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also Daniel 0. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of
City of Boerne v. Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom From
State and Local Infringement, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 633, 633 (1998).
75. See Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 876-82; Conkle, supra note 74, at 637.
76. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 883. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,402-03 (1963).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(3) (1994).
78. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
79. The Court did not address the validity of the RFRA with regard to federal laws and practices.
Conkle, supra note 74, at 633 n.5.
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holding that Congress exceeded its power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. ° As a result, the rule in Smith persisted: generally
applicable, religion-neutral state or local laws could burden religiously-
motivated conduct without triggering heightened judicial scrutiny.81
B. The Religious Liberty Protection Act: An Attempt To Pass
Constitutional Muster with Additional Constitutional Authority
In response to the Court's holding that the RFRA was
unconstitutional, some members of Congress attempted to adopt new
legislation that would survive a constitutional challenge and protect
religious liberty." The goal of the new legislation (RLPA) mirrored that
of the RFRA,83 but the new act relied on additional constitutional
authority.84 The Flores decision led Congress to believe that its ability to
enact religious liberty bills was limited to its Spending Clause power, its
Commerce Clause power, and its power to remedy states' constitutional
violations under the Fourteenth Amendment." The drafters used all of
these constitutional powers to justify their authority to enact and
implement the RLPA.86
The validity of the drafters' constitutional justifications was never
tested because Congress failed to pass the RLPA, due in part to fears that
80. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 516-36. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment states, in part, that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment states that "Congress
shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
81. See Conkle, supra note 74, at 633.
82. During the 105th Congress, the Subcommittee on the Constitution held five hearings on the
RLPA. Congress took no further action in 1998, but in the 106th Congress, the Subcommittee on the
Constitution held a hearing and two markup sessions on the RLPA. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 5
(1999).
83. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 13 (1999) ("[T]o restore the requirement that courts examine
substantial government burdens on the exercise of religion to determine whether the offending state
action is the 'least restrictive' means of furthering a 'compelling' governmental interest."); 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l) (1994) (providing that a purpose of the statute is to "restore the compelling
interest test").
84. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 12-18 (1999).
85. Id. at 12.
86. Id. at 12-18.
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its protection was too expansive.87 Many Senators were concerned that
the RLPA could violate various citizens' civil rights.88 For example, one
could foresee conflict between a state's interest in eliminating sexual
discrimination and the freedom of religious institutions to adhere to
practices of limiting eligibility for ordination into the clergy based on
sex.89 Therefore, although the House of Representatives passed the
RLPA overwhelmingly, it was never enacted into law.9"
C. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act: A
Narrower Statute for Religious Protection
After the Senate rejected the RLPA, Congress focused on drafting a
new statute that would provide much more limited protection to
religion." The RLUIPA prohibits state and local governments from
imposing land use regulations that substantially burden the religious
exercise of a person or institution unless the government demonstrates
that the regulation serves a compelling governmental interest and is the
least restrictive means of furthering that interest.92
Although the RLUIPA codifies the same strict scrutiny standard found
in the RFRA and the RLPA, the RLUIPA has a more narrow scope.
Whereas the RFRA and the RLPA applied to any state action that
offended the free exercise of religion,93 the RLUIPA only addresses
burdens imposed on religion through land use decisions and through
regulation of persons housed in state institutions.94 Thus, Congress
minimized potential conflicts with some civil rights.95 The American
Civil Liberties Union and other groups who had expressed concerns
about the RLPA's impact on civil rights supported the RLUIPA.96
87. 146 CONG. REc. 57778 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Reid).
88. Id.; H.R. RFP. No. 106-219, at 13-14 (1999).
89. See id. at 14.
90. See H.tR 1691, 106th Cong. (Ist Sess. 1999); 146 CONG. REc. S7778 (daily ed. July 27, 2000)
(statement of Sen. Reid).
91. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-5 (2000).
92. Id. § 2000cc(a)(1).
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a); H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999).
94. Id. §§ 2000cc to cc-5.
95. See 146 CoNG. REc. S7777-78 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
96. 146 CONG. REc. H7191 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement ofRep. Nadler); 146 CONG. REC.
S7777 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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1. RLUIPA's Purpose: To Protect the Right To Gather and Worship
The land use provision of the RLUIPA is intended to protect the right
to "gather and worship."97 Although the legislative history behind the
RLUIPA is limited because it passed both houses without committee
action,9 8 speeches in both the House and the Senate provide some
background.99 Senators Hatch and Kennedy indicated that the RLUIPA
targets land use regulation because local land use decisions frequently
burden religious liberty.'0 0 As justification for the RLUIPA's land use
provision, Senators Hatch and Kennedy referred to evidence showing
that zoning codes facially discriminate against churches and that zoning
boards frequently apply neutral regulations in a discriminatory manner.'
0 1
2. Congress's Constitutional Authority for Enacting the RL UIPA
Legislative history and the express language of the statute reveal
Congress's determination that it had the constitutional authority to enact
the RLUIPA based in part on the Commerce Clause. 0 2 Under the
Commerce Clause, Congress can "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'
0 3
The RLUIPA states that the statute applies in any case in which "the
substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would
affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with
97. 146 CONG. REc. H7 191 (statement of Rep. Canady).
98. 146 CONG. REC. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady).
99. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. H7190-91 (statement of Rep. Canady); 146 CONG. REC. S7774
(statement of Sen. Hatch); 146 CONG. REc. E1563-64 (statement of Rep. Canady).
100. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-95 (exhibit 1).
101. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-75 (exhibit 1). Support for this conclusion took the form of
anecdotes and statistics from national surveys, summarized in the report of the House Committee on
the Judiciary regarding the RLPA. H.R. REP. 106-219, at 18-24 (1999); see also Issues Relating to
Religious Liberty Protection, and Focusing on the Constitutionality of a Religious Protection
Measure: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 72-101 (1999)
(statement of Douglas Laycock, Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas
School of Law); Laycock, supra note 55, at 769-83.
102. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (exhibit 1); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (2000). In addition to the Commerce Clause, Congress asserted that its authority
to enact the RLUIPA also is based on the Spending Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 146 CONG. REc. S7774-76 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (exhibit 1).
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Indian tribes, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability. ' '
Congress determined that land use regulations that burden religion
substantially affect interstate commerce, 05 basing this finding primarily
on the legislative history of the RLPA. Congress relied on Marc Stem's
testimony to the House Subcommittee on the Constitution regarding the
RLPA on June 16, 1998.106 His comments were aimed at demonstrating
that religion, as a whole, is a major economic factor in the United
States. 7 In his written statement, he cited statistics regarding property
controlled by religious institutions, noting that these institutions spent $6
billion in 1992 on capital improvements and construction." 8 In New
York and Wisconsin, the value of property controlled by religious
institutions was $17.1 billion and $5 billion, respectively.'09 He also
opined, without citing statistics, that land use regulation limiting the
ability of religious institutions to build or expand affects interstate
movement of goods and services."0
After two failed attempts to implement a broader religious freedom
statute, Congress adopted the more narrow statute focused on local
governments' land use regulation."' One of the primary objectives of the
RLUIPA is to prevent local governments from substantially burdening
religion with their land use regulations."' Congress asserted that it had
the authority to adopt the RLUIPA based, in part, on the Commerce
Clause because it believed land use regulation substantially affects
interstate commerce." 3
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (2000).
105. See 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (exhibit 1).
106. Id. Mr. Stem, the Director of the Legal Department of the American Jewish Congress,
provided oral testimony and a prepared written statement to the House Subcommittee. See Religious
Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 4019 Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution
of the Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 54-65 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 RLPA] (statement of
Marc Stem, Director, Legal Department, American Jewish Congress).
107. 1998 RLPA, supra note 106, at 54-65.
108. 1998 RLPA, supra note 106, at 54-65.
109. 1998 RLPA, supra note 106, at 59.
110. 1998 RLPA, supra note 106, at 58.
111. 42 U.S.C.§§ 2000cc to cc-5 (2000).
112. Id. § 2000cc(a)(1).
113. See 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (exhibit 1).
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III. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: A LIMITATION ON
CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE INTRASTATE
ACTIVITY
Congress must base its authority to regulate local governments' land
use decisions on a constitutionally granted power."' Since 1824, the
U.S. Supreme Court has limited to varying degrees Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause. 15 In 1995, in United States v. Lopez,' 6 the
Court returned to a narrow interpretation of Congress's Commerce
Clause power, allowing regulation only of those activities that are
economic in nature and that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 17 This narrow interpretation was reinforced in 2000, in
United States v. Morrison."8
A. Pre-Lopez Interpretation of the Commerce Clause
Gibbons v. Ogden,"9 decided in 1824, was the first U.S. Supreme
Court case to define "commerce."'' 20 In Gibbons, Justice Marshall
expressed a broad notion of commerce, stating that it represents more
than just "buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities.'1' The
Court defined commerce as "the commercial intercourse between nations
and parts of nations,"' 22 but also reasoned that, although the commercial
activity must affect commerce between the states, commerce power
could reach within the borders of a state.12
3
After 1888, the Court began narrowing its interpretation of the
Commerce Clause. At the turn of the century, the Court invoked a
formulistic approach for invalidating federal social and economic
114. Congress may exercise only those powers granted to it in the U.S. Constitution. United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
115. Compare. e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) with NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
116. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
117. Id. at 559-68.
118. 529 U.S. 598, 607-19 (2000).
119. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
120. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253-
54 (1964).
121. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 189.
122. Id. at 189-90.
123. Id. at 194.
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regulations. 24 It began distinguishing between regulations "directly" and
"indirectly" affecting interstate commerce; those regulations only
"indirectly" affecting commerce exceeded Congress's federal powers. 2
For example, the Court held that regulations relating to "manufacturing"
were invalid because they only indirectly affected commerce. 2 a
The Court's approach to the Commerce Clause changed dramatically
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.'27 Specifically, the Jones &
Laughlin Court addressed the constitutionality of the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA),' which established a comprehensive
system for regulating labor relations in all industries affecting interstate
commerce."' The Court abandoned its previous distinction between
"indirect" and "direct" effects on interstate commerce, and instead
adopted a "substantial relations" test. 3° The Court stated that although
activities-when considered separately-may be intrastate in nature,
Congress may regulate the activities "if they have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control" is necessary
to protect commerce from interference.'
3
'
The Court continued its broad view of the Commerce Clause in
Wickard v. Filburn132 Although the activity at issue was an individual's
production of wheat for home consumption, the Court determined that it
fell under Congress's Commerce power. 33 The Court explained that it
did not matter that Filburn's effect on the price of wheat was trivial
124. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 605 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238, 303-304 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 545-548
(1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908));
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE §4.6, at 425-26 (3d ed. 1999).
125. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 124, at 422; see also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.,
295 U.S. at 546 (holding that there is a "well-established distinction between direct and indirect
effects").
126. See, eg., Carter, 298 U.S. at 303-04 (invalidating act prohibiting unfair labor practices in
coal industry because it regulated "mining" and "production," rather than "commerce"); United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895) (holding that Sherman Act did not reach a sugar
refinery monopoly because Constitution did not permit Congress to regulate "manufacturing").
127. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
128. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).
129. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 22-24.
130. Id. at 37.
131. Id.
132. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
133. Id. at 118-29.
1269
Washington Law Review
because his contribution to the market "taken together with that of many
others similarly situated, [was] far from trivial.' 34
As a result, the Court vastly expanded Congress's Commerce Clause
power during the period beginning in 1935 with Jones & Laughlin and
ending in 1995 with Lopez. 35 The Court overwhelmingly deferred to
Congress's judgment regarding which activities fell under its Commerce
Clause power. In fact, in the fifty-three years following Wickard, every
statute Congress enacted under that power passed judicial review. 36
B. The Court's Current Interpretation of the Commerce Clause
In 1995, the Supreme Court substantially narrowed its view of
Congress's Commerce Clause power by holding in United States v.
Lopez137 that Congress could only reach economic activities that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. 3 ' The defendant in Lopez was
convicted for possessing a firearm in a school zone in violation of the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA), 39 which made it a federal
offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that
the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone."' 40 The defendant argued that Congress lacked authority to pass the
GFSZA and the Supreme Court agreed.'4 '
In United States v. Morrison,142 the Court continued on to narrow
Congress's Commerce Clause power. The Court held, by a five to four
vote, that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority by
establishing a civil remedy under Section 13,981143 of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA).' 44 The act stated that "[a]ll
persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from
134. Id. at 127-28 (describing the "aggregate" principle).
135. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995).
136. Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First
Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations But Preserve State Control Over Social
Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1,83-84 (1999).
137. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
138. Id. at 559-68.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
140. Id. § 922(q)(2)(A).
141. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
142. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 (1994).
144. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
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crimes of violence motivated by gender."'45 Subsection (c) stated that
anyone who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender is liable to
the injured party for damages, injunctive, and declaratory relief.'46 The
defendants successfully argued that Congress lacked the authority to pass
this act. 47
The Court in Lopez and Morrison established a new framework to
evaluate the validity of statutes enacted under Congress's Commerce
Clause power. First, the regulated activity must be economic in nature.
48
Second, the Court set forth the following three elements to guide lower
courts in determining whether the activity has substantial interstate
effects: (1) whether Congress accumulated findings indicating that the
regulated activity has interstate effects, (2) the strength of the nexus
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce, and (3) whether
the statute contains a jurisdictional element.'49
1. Definition of "Economic Activity"
According to the Court in Lopez and Morrison, the central issue in
evaluating the constitutionality of the GFSZA and VAWA was whether
the regulated activity was economic in nature in that it must involve
economic enterprise and commercial transactions. 5 The Court in Lopez
narrowed the substantial effects test established in Jones & Laughlin by
requiring not only that the activity at issue substantially affect interstate
commerce, but also that it be economic in nature.' The Court in
Morrison confirmed that the constitutionality of a statute enacted under
the Commerce Clause depends on the economic nature of the activity
being regulated.'52 The Morrison Court stated that a proper interpretation
145. 42 U.S.C. § 13,981(b).
146. Id. § 13,981(c).
147. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
148. See id. at 610-11; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-61 (1995).
149. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-68.
150. See infra notes 151-77 and accompanying text.
151. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
152. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11. Legal scholars and lower courts have debated about how to
interpret the requirement that a federal regulation relate to an economic activity. Many have
interpreted this requirement broadly. See, e.g., United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 261-63 (3d
Cir. 2000) (holding that, although the connection to economic or commercial activity plays a central
role in whether a law is valid, economic activity can be understood in broad terms); Gibbs v. Babbitt,
214 F.3d 483,491 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[E]conomic activity must be understood in broad terms. Indeed,
a cramped view of commerce would cripple a foremost federal power and in so doing would
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of Lopez demonstrates that the "noneconomic, criminal nature" of the act
of carrying a gun in a school zone was critical to the Court's decision
rejecting the validity of the GFSZA' 53 In fact, the Lopez Court
distinguished past cases in which it had upheld congressional acts
regulating economic activity under the Commerce Clause because the
activity related to an economic endeavor or enterprise. 5 4 In past
Commerce Clause cases the regulated activity always arose out of, or
was connected to, a commercial transaction. 5
The Court in Lopez referenced numerous cases to support its
reasoning that regulated activities at issue in previous Commerce Clause
cases always related to an economic endeavor and commercial
transactions. 156 For example, the Court cited Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 57 in which the Court upheld, as a valid
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power, the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act, which regulated coal-mining operations
involved in mining and selling coal interstate.'58 In addition, the Court
referred to Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States5 9 and
Katzenbach v. McClung, 60 which held that Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was constitutional under the Commerce Clause because it
eviscerate national authority."); Sara E. Kropf, The Failure of United States v. Lopez: Analyzing the
Violence Against Women Act, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 373, 395-97 (1999) (reading
Lopez to mean that "activity need not be strictly economic but must at least relate to economic
activity in some way, either through its substantial effects or another indirect link"); Kerrie E.
Maloney, Note, Gender-Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights Provision
of the Violence Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1876, 1914-21 (1996) (stating
that Lopez does not require the regulated activity to be economic, only that it be tied in some way to
economic activity).
153 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
154 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61. The Morrison Court also emphasized that the federal regulations
the Court has sustained in past cases have involved economic endeavors. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611.
155. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564, 573 (1997) (holding that, although petitioner's camp was a non-profit business, it
engaged in interstate commerce by purchasing and providing goods and services out of state).
156. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61. Some commentators question the Lopez Court's characterization
of past Commerce Clause cases. See, e.g., Maloney, supra note 152, at 1915; Jil Martin, Note,
United States v. Morrison: Federalism Against the Will of the States, 32 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 243, 317-
18 (2000) ("The most obvious conflict with established parameters is the Chief Justice's
classification of the intrastate activity in prior Supreme Court Commerce Clause opinions as being
exclusively economic in nature.").
157 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
158. Id. at 276-84.
159. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
160. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
1272
Religious Liberty and the Commerce Clause
aimed to remove burdens on interstate commerce. 6' The cases reasoned
that discriminatory practices by hotels and restaurants burdened interstate
commerce because they discouraged interstate travel.'62 Therefore, hotels
that catered to interstate guests, and restaurants that necessitated the
interstate movement of the food products served to customers, were
subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.'63
In addition, the Lopez Court cited Perez v. United States,'14 which held
that the Consumer Protection Act's prohibition of loan sharking was
constitutional under Congress's Commerce Clause power because an
individual's loan sharking activities substantially affect interstate
commerce. 65 The common tie among each of these cited cases is that all
of the regulated activities relate to an economic enterprise involved in
commercial transactions. Coal mining operations relate to the selling of
coal; hotels and restaurants purchase supplies and sell food or
accommodations; and loan sharking relates to illegal credit transactions.
Finally, the Lopez Court found that, even in Wickard v. Filburn,66 the
activity subject to regulation was economic in nature. 167 The Lopez Court
stated that wheat production is an "essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut
unless the intrastate activity were regulated."1 68 Because interstate
commercial transactions, namely the buying and selling of wheat,
depended upon wheat production, that production could be regulated
under the Commerce Clause, whether or not the landowner planned to
sell his wheat in interstate commerce. 69 As a result, the Lopez Court's
recharacterization of federal Commerce Clause power makes a finding of
economic activity crucial in determining the validity of a statute under
the Commerce Clause.
Under this new emphasis on economic activity, the Court rejected the
federal regulations at issue in Lopez and Morrison, holding that neither
161. See Kaizenbach, 379 U.S. at 301-05; Heart ofAtlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 253-62.
162. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300-01; Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252-53.
Discrimination by restaurants also burdens "the interstate flow of food and.., the movement of
products generally." Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303.
163. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 301-05; Heart ofAtlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 253-62.
164. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
165. Id. at 156-57.
166. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
167. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560-61 (1995).
168. Id.
169. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942).
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regulated economic activity.17 ' The Court held that both regulations
therefore exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power.' 7' The GFSZA
was a criminal statute that was unrelated, even in the broadest sense, to
commerce or an economic enterprise.172 The Lopez Court found that the
GFSZA could not be sustained under the line of cases upholding
regulations that "arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially [affect]
interstate commerce."173 Similarly, in Morrison, the Court stated that
gender-motivated crimes of violence are not economic activity "in any
sense of the phrase". 1
74
The Lopez Court did reaffirm the Wickard "aggregate" principle, but it
held that the principle has been used only to aggregate activities that
"arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction."'175 The
Court in Morrison clarified its stance on the aggregation principle,
declining to adopt "a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of
any noneconomic activity."' 176 However, thus far in the history of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court has only upheld regulations
when the activity is economic in nature. 77 Thus, in evaluating a new
federal regulation, courts should consider whether the activity in question
is economic in nature, in the sense that it involves an economic
enterprise and commercial transactions, which-in the aggregate-affect
interstate commerce.
2. Interstate Effect Analysis
Even if a court finds that an activity is economic in nature, the activity
must still have substantial interstate effects before it can be federally
regulated under the Commerce Clause. 7 The Lopez Court set forth for
170. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
171. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
172. Id.
173. Id. The government argued, inter alia, that the GFSZA was related to interstate commerce
because the presence of guns in school areas results in violent crime, which in turn negatively
impacts the nation's economy. Id. at 563-64.
174. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
175. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
176. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
177. Id. at 613, 617 (rejecting "the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce").
178. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
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1 7 1
the first time three elements to assist courts in determining whether an
activity has interstate effects: (1) whether legislative findings indicate
that the activity has interstate effects, (2) the strength of the nexus
between the activity and interstate commerce, and (3) whether the statute
contains ajurisdictional element. 79
a. The Presence of Congressional Findings
Congressional findings, while not dispositive, are helpful in enabling
courts to evaluate Congress's judgment that the regulated activity
substantially burdens interstate commerce. 80 In Lopez, Congress did not
support its assertion that possession of a gun in a school zone
substantially affects interstate commerce with any legislative or
congressional committee findings.' In contrast, the Court in Morrison
stated that Congress provided a significant amount of evidence regarding
the effect of gender-motivated crimes on victims and their families.'82
Although the Court did not discredit these findings, it stated that the
presence of congressional findings alone is insufficient to uphold the
constitutionality of the Commerce Clause regulation.'
b. The Nexus Between the Activity and Interstate Commerce
The Court, in both Lopez and Morrison, examined the strength of the
connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce.'84 In
both cases, this link was too attenuated. For example, in Lopez the
government argued that the possession of a gun in a school zone affects
interstate commerce because such an activity may result in violent
crime. 8 Crime affects the national economy because its costs are spread
among the population through the price of insurance, and people are less
likely to travel to a high crime area.'86 In addition, guns in school zones
179. Id. at 561-68.
180. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63).
181. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
182. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
183. Id. at 614-15 (failing to invalidate Congress's findings, but stating that Congress's findings
were "substantially weakened" because they relied on a method of reasoning the Court rejected); see
also infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing Congress's method of reasoning).
184. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-13, 615-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-68.




affect the educational process, which might lead to less productive
citizens, thereby hurting the nation's economy.8 7 In Morrison, the
government argued that gender motivated crimes affect interstate
commerce by deterring potential victims from engaging in employment
and traveling interstate.'88  Furthermore, violence against women
decreases national productivity, increases medical costs, and decreases
supply and demand for interstate products.'89 Despite these potential
connections, the Court in both cases held that the regulated activity did
not substantially affect interstate commerce.1 90
The Court in both Lopez and Morrison emphasized that the
government would have the Court follow the "but-for causal chain from
the initial occurrence of violent crime to every attenuated effect upon
interstate commerce."'19' The Lopez Court feared that "pil[ing] inference
upon inference ' ' would lead to federal retention of a general police
power, which is properly reserved to the States. 93 In both Lopez and
Morrison, the Court stated that accepting the government's logic would
mean that Congress could regulate not only all violent crimes, but also
those activities that lead to violent crimes, regardless of their relationship
to interstate commerce.' 94 The Lopez Court further indicated that it would
be hard to imagine any activity by an individual that would be beyond
the scope of Congress's Commerce power under this reasoning.'95 In
Lopez and Morrison, the Court was particularly concerned about the
separation of powers implications resulting from the government's
arguments. 
1 96
c. The Presence of a Jurisdictional Element in the Statute
The presence of a jurisdictional element in a statute provides support
for the proposition that the regulated activity is not merely local in
187. Id.
188. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385).
189. Id.
190. See id. at 614-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-68.
191. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-13,615-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-68.
192. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
193. Id.
194. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
195. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
196. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-68.
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nature, but has some connection to interstate commerce.'97 The Lopez
Court stressed that the purpose of a jurisdictional element is to ensure
through a "case-by-case inquiry" that the statute's reach is limited to
those activities that affect interstate commerce. 98 The statute addressed
in United States v. Bass199 provides an example of such a jurisdictional
element. 00 The Bass court addressed 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a), which
states, in part, that any convicted felon "who receives, possesses, or
transports in commerce or affecting commerce.., any firearm shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years,
or both." '' The Court's interpretation of the language "in commerce or
affecting commerce" was critical to its determination that the statute
passed constitutional muster.02 The offenses of receiving, possessing,
and transporting must occur in commerce or affect commerce to
implicate the statute,' °3 thereby creating a jurisdictional element.2 The
government could meet its interstate commerce burden by demonstrating
that the gun had previously traveled interstate, was moving interstate,
was on an interstate facility at the time of the offense, or that possession
of the gun affected commerce.0 5
In contrast, neither of the acts at issue in Lopez and Morrison
contained a jurisdictional element. The GFSZA did not limit the statute's
reach to a "discrete set of firearm possessions" that clearly would have
impacted interstate commerce.2 6 The Morrison Court likewise found that
the VAWA contained no jurisdictional element.0 7 The Court stated that
Congress chose to extend the reach of the VAWA to regulate a body of
violent crime occurring within the states.
208
197. Id. at 561-62.
198. Id.
199. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
200. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (citing Bass, 404 U.S. at 347,349).
201. 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) (1970), quoted in Bass, 404 U.S. at 337.
202. Bass, 404 U.S. at 349-50.
203. See id. at 347-51.
204. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.
205. Bass, 404 U.S. at 350-51.
206. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.




IV. CONGRESS EXCEEDED ITS COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER
IN ENACTING THE RLUIPA
The RLUIPA represents an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause power because land use regulation does not constitute
an economic enterprise or a commercial transaction and does not
substantially affect interstate commerce. Beginning with Lopez, the
Court emphasized that the regulated activity must be economic in nature;
that is, it must relate to an economic enterprise and commercial
transactions, for Congress to exercise its Commerce power." 9 Land use
regulation does not constitute an economic enterprise or a commercial
transaction..2 10 Although economics, in addition to public safety and
aesthetic considerations, factor into local governments' land use
decisions regulating religious use, this connection does not bring land




Even if land use decisions are deemed to constitute economic activity,
the RLUIPA is still unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause
because Congress has not satisfied the elements the Court set forth to
ensure that the regulated activity has substantial interstate effects on
commerce. First, Congress accumulated little evidence to support its
assertion that the economic impact of land use decisions affecting
religion is substantial.1 2 Second, the nexus between land use regulation
and interstate commerce is too tenuous because one has to make several
inferences to conclude that a land use regulation has an impact on
interstate commerce. Furthermore, the Court will not allow the federal
government to infringe on an activity properly reserved by the state.21 3
Finally, although the RLUIPA contains a jurisdictional element, it is not
effective because it does not allow for a case-by-case inquiry to ensure
that the land use regulation has interstate effects.1
209. See id. at 610-11; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
210. See infra Part IV.A.
211. See infra Part IV.B.
212. See infra Part IV.B.1.
213. See infra Part iV.B.2.
214. See infra Part IV.B.3.
1278
Vol. 76:1255, 2001
Religious Liberty and the Commerce Clause
A. The RLUIPA Does Not Regulate Economic Activity
Land use regulation is the activity a court must evaluate to determine
whether the RLUIPA is valid under the Commerce Clause.2"5 Under
Lopez, a regulated activity must constitute economic activity by
involving economic enterprise and commercial transactions. 216 Land use
regulation is more comparable to the non-economic activities at issue in
Lopez and Morrison than it is to the Lopez Court's list of activities
exemplifying economic activity.217  Although various economic
considerations factor into land use regulation, this does not establish that
land use regulation constitutes economic activity as defined by the
Court.
218
Determining what activity a statute regulates is critical for evaluating
the constitutionality of the statute under the Commerce Clause.1 9
Congress enacted the RLUIPA to regulate local governments' land use
decisions due to concerns that local governments were overly burdening
religion. ° Therefore, to evaluate the constitutionality of the RLUIPA
under the Commerce Clause, a court must determine whether land use
regulation constitutes economic activity.
The Lopez Court listed several past Commerce Clause cases to
demonstrate that its definition of economic activity was quite narrow."
The Court revealed that the activities of coal mining operations involved
in the sale of coal, restaurants that purchase supplies and sell food, hotels
that rent rooms, and loan sharks that engage in extortionate credit
transactions all constitute economic activity.'m These specific references
suggest that, to meet the definition of economic activity, a regulated
activity must involve economic enterprise and commercial
transactions.'
215. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-5 (2000).
216. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-61 (1995).
217. See id. at 559-61.
218. See supra Parts I.A, B.2.
219. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
221. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
222. See supra Part Ill.B.1.
223. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
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In contrast, the regulated activities at issue in Lopez and Morrison did
not constitute economic activity. 224 Neither the act of carrying a gun in a
school zone nor the act of committing a gender-motivated crime meets
the narrow definition of economic activity set forth in Lopez. 22 Although
proponents of the GFSZA and the VAWA argued that the regulated
activities impacted interstate commerce,226 the Court held that mere
economic effects were insufficient to satisfy its definition of economic
activity. 227 Therefore, because the regulated activities were not economic
in nature, neither congressional act was justified under the Commerce
Clause.
As with the regulated activities in Lopez and Morrison, land use
regulation fails to satisfy the Court's narrow definition of economic
activity. Land use regulation itself is not an economic endeavor and does
not involve a transaction or the buying and selling of goods.221 Of course,
land use regulation might encourage or prevent future economic
transactions, such as the buying and selling of construction materials.229
Nonetheless, in Lopez and Morrison, the Court held that the economic
nature of the activity is key, not the economic effects. 2 ° Therefore, any
future impact on a commercial transaction does not bring land use
regulation within the Court's narrow definition of economic activity.
Supporters of the RLUIPA may argue that land use determinations
often involve economic considerations, thus making land use regulation
an economic activity. For example, local governments often adopt land
use regulations for the protection of aesthetics and public safety "with a
view to conserving the value of buildings, '231 and one rationale for
excluding religious uses from residential areas is the possible detrimental
224. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
225. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
226. Morrison, 529 U S. at 615; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64.
227. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
228. See supra Part 1.
229. 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (exhibit I).
230. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61. The Court has historically
recognized that numerous trivial effects may substantially affect interstate commerce when
considered in the aggregate. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
Nonetheless, the aggregate principle is unrelated to the determination of whether land use regulation
constitutes economic activity; the Morrison Court suggested that the Court has invoked the
aggregation principle only in those cases in which the regulated activity is economic in nature.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
231. SZEA, supra note 15, at Appendix A, 215.
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effect on the property values in the community. 1 2 The goal of preserving
property values is an economic consideration. Further, in both City of
Chicago Heights and Cornerstone Bible Church, courts upheld exclusion
of religious uses from industrial zones to foster "economic stability and
growth," 3 to stimulate commercial development, and to dedicate an area
for industry."4
These economic considerations, however, merely influence land use
regulation. Non-economic factors play an equally important role. The
SZEA suggests that land use zoning emerged out of a concern for public
safety and aesthetics. 5 Courts also have recognized that promoting
public health and safety and aesthetics are primary purposes of land use
regulation, 6 and local governments' justifications for excluding
religious uses frequently are based on aesthetic and nuisance-type
concerns." 7 Although economic considerations may play a role in land
use determinations, they are merely part of a host of other factors that
influence land use regulation. Furthermore, the mere consideration of
economics, by itself, does not convert land use regulation into economic
activity. 8 Even if local governments consider economics in making land
use determinations, this factor alone does not justify Congress's
regulation of such decisions based on the Commerce Clause.
Another connection between land use regulation and economics might
occur if a land use regulation implicates the Takings Clause.239 A
regulatory taking might implicate "economic activity" in two ways. First,
232. See, e.g., Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood,
699 F.2d 303, 305 (6th Cir. 1983); West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 121
A.2d 640, 642-43 (Conn. 1956); Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 330 P.2d 5, 17
(Or. 1958).
233. City of Chi. Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church and Ministries, Inc., 707
N.E.2d 53,59 (Ill. App. 1999), rev'd in part, 749 N.E.2d 916, 932 (I11. 2001).
234. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 661 (D. Minn. 1990).
235. SZEA, supra note 15, at Appendix A, at 212-15.
236. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,394-95 (1926).
237. See, e.g., Lakewood Congregation, 699 F.2d at 308; Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward,
655 P.2d 1293, 1298 (Alaska 1982); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 203 P.2d 823, 825 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Lutheran High Sch.
Ass'n v. City of Farmington Hills, 381 N.W.2d 417,419,421 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
238. See supra Part III.B.1.
239. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation."). A regulation is an unconstitutional taking when it "denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
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the court must determine when the government has taken private
property for public use by asking whether the land use regulation
deprives the landowner of all economically beneficial or productive use
of the land.24° Second, the government must pay landowners the value of
their land when private property is taken for public use.241 These two
economic implications of a taking, however, should be considered
merely effects of land use regulation. The Court in Lopez and Morrison
stated that the nature of the activity, not its effects, is key in determining
whether land use regulation constitutes "economic activity." 242
Furthermore, the takings analysis does not suggest that land use
regulation itself involves an economic transaction. Therefore, a court is
not likely to find that a takings claim transforms land use regulation into
"economic activity."
Land use regulation does not fall within the Lopez Court's narrow
definition of economic activity. Land use regulation more closely
resembles the regulated activities in Lopez and Morrison. A mere
connection to economics does not suggest that the activity is economic in
nature. Instead, an activity that is economic in nature must involve
economic enterprise and commercial transactions. Because land use
regulation is not an economic enterprise and does not involve
commercial transactions, it cannot be characterized as economic activity
for Commerce Clause purposes.
B. The RLUIPA Does Not Regulate an Activity That Has Substantial
Effects on Interstate Commerce
Even if courts were to determine that the RLUIPA regulates economic
activity, the RLUIPA does not satisfy the elements courts must evaluate
to ensure that the regulated activity "substantially affects interstate
commerce." 243 Thus, Congress lacked the Commerce Clause authority to
enact the statute due to its tenuous effect on interstate commerce.2 44
Courts should hold that Congress has failed to ensure that the RLUIPA is
limited to the regulation of interstate activity for the following reasons:
240. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
241. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
242. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-11 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 559-61 (1995).
243. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
244. See infra Parts IV.B.I-B.3.
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(1) Congress failed to set forth findings indicating land use regulation
has interstate effects; 25 (2) the strength of the nexus between land use
regulation and the economy is too tenuous;246 and, (3) the RLUIPA does
not have an effective jurisdictional element.247
1. Congressional Findings Do Not Support the Interstate Commerce
Effects of the RLUIPA
Congress failed to set forth legislative findings regarding the effect
land use regulations that burden religion have on interstate commerce.
Although Congress passed the RLUIPA without committee action, it
relied on the legislative history of the RLPA in enacting the RLUIPA.248
The RLPA's legislative history contains a vast amount of evidence
explaining the detrimental impact land use determinations can have on
religion.249 Little, if any, of this material, however, focuses on the
potential economic impact land use determinations might have on the
interstate eeonomy. °
In support of the RLUIPA, Senators Hatch and Kennedy stated that
the economic impact of land use decisions affecting religion was
substantial."M The Senators, however, incorrectly reported that Marc D.
Stem's testimony presented data to confirm such a statement.52 Stem
emphasized the impact religious activity has on the economy. 3 Stem's
statistical information regarding the value of property controlled by
religious institutions was unrelated to any possible impact land use
decisions affecting religion have on interstate commerce.254 Although he
indicated that religious institutions spent $8 billion in 1992 on capital
245. See infra Part W.B.1.
246. See infra Part IV.B.2.
247. See infra Part IV.B.3.
248. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (exhibit 1) (citing H.R. REP. No.
106-219 (1999); 1998 RLPA, supra note 106, at 54-65 (statement of Marc Stem, Director, Legal
Department, American Jewish Congress).
249. See H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 18-24 (1999); 146 CONG. REc. E1564-67 (daily ed.
September 22,2000) (statement of Rep. Hyde); 146 CONG. REC. S7774-75 (daily ed. July 27,2000)
(exhibit 1).
250. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 18-24 (1999); 146 CONG. REC. E1564-67 (statement of Rep.
Hyde); 146 CONG. REC. S7774-75 (exhibit 1).
251. 146 CONG. REc. S7775 (exhibit 1).
252. See id.
253. See 1998 RLPA, supra note 106, at 54-65.
254. See 1998 RLPA, supra note 106 at 58-59.
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improvements to facilities, his assertion that land use regulations may
impact the interstate movement of supplies and services for the
construction of facilities was unsupported. 255 This lack of legislative
findings regarding land use decisions affecting religious uses does not
support Congress's assertion that it has the authority to enact the
RLUIPA under its Commerce Clause power.
2. The Nexus Between Land Use Decisions and Interstate Commerce
Is Too Tenuous
The link between land use regulation and its effect on interstate
commerce is too attenuated to give Congress authority to regulate local
land use decisions under the Commerce Clause. Congress's reasoning in
support of the RLUIPA is similar to the "but-for causal chain" the Court
rejected when evaluating the GFSZA. 6 and the VAWA.257 In Lopez, the
Court also rejected the government's logic of "piling inference upon
inference" to conclude that the regulated activity impacted interstate
economy.2 18 The same piling of inferences is needed to connect land use
regulation to the interstate economy.
Land use regulation admittedly is more closely connected to the
interstate economy than possessing a gun in a school zone or committing
a gender-motivated crime. Nonetheless, the connection is still not
sufficient.259 In Lopez, the government argued that violent crime caused
by the possession of a gun in a school zone substantially affects interstate
commerce. 26" For example, gun regulation might decrease travel to the
high crime area.26 To reach this conclusion, one would have to infer that
possessing the gun in a school zone would actually lead to a violent
crime. Furthermore, one would have to assume that the crime would
actually cause people not to travel to that area, and that this decrease in
travel would affect interstate commerce. The link between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce arguably was more direct in Morrison
255. See 1998 RLPA, supra note 106 at 58.
256. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-68 (1995).
257. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000).
258. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
259. Compare supra, Part I (describing land use regulation) with Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 and
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64 (detailing the government's argument for how gender-motivated crimes
and the possession of a gun in a school zone affect interstate commerce).




Religious Liberty and the Commerce Clause
because the VAWA regulates the violent crime itself.262 Thus, the
significant inference one would have to make under Morrison is that the
gender-motivated crime affects interstate commerce, perhaps by
deterring the victim from traveling interstate or from engaging in
employment. 63
Similar to the regulated activities in Lopez and Morrison, a land use
regulation restricting religious uses does not directly implicate interstate
commerce. To show that religious land use regulation substantially
impacts interstate commerce, one would have to infer that the regulation
would cause a religious institution to refrain from undertaking an action.
For example, in considering a land use ordinance restricting the ability of
a church to expand, a court would first have to infer that a church
intended to expand. The court would then have to make the additional
inference that the church's inability to expand would somehow affect
interstate commerce, perhaps by decreasing the demand for interstate
labor or interstate supplies.26 Thus, the number and type of inferences
one has to make to conclude that a religious land use regulation affects
interstate commerce is similar to the reasoning the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected in Lopez and Morrison. 5 Congress asserted that land use
decisions prevented specific economic transactions such as the
construction of a facility or the sale, purchase, or rental of a building. 66
The prevention of an interstate economic transaction is a possible effect
of a land use regulation; however, a court would have to "pile inference
upon inference" to conclusively determine that land use regulation
substantially affects interstate commerce.
Accepting Congress's reasoning for enacting the RLUIPA under its
Commerce Clause authority would suggest that Congress could regulate
all local land use regulations. The Court in Morrison stated that allowing
Congress to regulate gender-motivated crimes would allow Congress to
262. Kropf, supra note 152, at 402.
263. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
264. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Part llI.B.2.b. The connection between a land use regulation and interstate
commerce arguably may be more direct given alternative fact patterns. For example, a regulation
preventing a church expansion might more directly affect interstate commerce if the church could
prove with specific evidence that it intended to use a product that only was manufactured out of
state. However, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected even these more closely-related connections in
Morrison, where the regulated activity was only two steps removed from interstate commerce. See
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-19.
266. 146 CONG. REc. S7775 (daily ed. July 27,2000) (exhibit 1).
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regulate any type of violent crime because gender-motivated violence,
"as a subset of all violent crime, is certain to have lesser economic
impacts than the larger class of which it is a part. ' 267 The Court feared
that allowing Congress to regulate all violent crime would result in the
obliteration of "the Constitution's distinction between national and local
authority. '268 Similarly, if the court affirmed Congress's authority under
the Commerce Clause, a land use determination, regardless of whether it
burdened religious uses, would fall within Congress's Commerce Clause
authority because every land use decision would have some effect on
interstate commerce.
Although every land use regulation may have a distant effect on
interstate commerce, courts should be reluctant to approve legislation
that would lead to unlimited congressional Commerce Clause power over
a function that traditionally has been left to the states.269 The Court in
Lopez stated that the Commerce Clause is subject to outer limits and
must not be extended so far that it destroys the distinction between what
is local and what is national, thus creating a centralized government.270
The Court rejected Congress's reasoning for nationalizing regulation of
crimes motivated by gender because the reasoning could be "applied
equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state
regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and
childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant."
27
'
Similarly, Congress's reasoning in support of the RLUIPA could be
applied equally as well to all land use regulation, and the Court has held
that land use regulation, like criminal law enforcement or education, is a
function that historically has been performed by the states.272 This
concern for preserving state sovereignty as well as the attenuated
connection between land use regulation and interstate commerce
suggests that Congress does not have authority under the Commerce
Clause to enact the RLUIPA.
267. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
268. Id.
269. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174
(2001); (stating that States have "traditional and primary power over land and water use"); Hess v
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) ("[R]egulation of land use [is] a function
traditionally performed by local governments.").
270. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
271. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16.
272. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 174; Hess, 513 U.S. at 44.
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3. The RLUIPA Does Not Contain an Effective Jurisdictional Element
The jurisdictional element contained in the RLUIPA fails to
accomplish its required purpose. As expressed in Lopez, the purpose of a
jurisdictional element is to ensure through a case-by-case inquiry that
only activities with interstate effects are regulated.273 The RLUIPA's
scope of application states that it only applies when a land use regulation
affects interstate commerce.274 In the joint statement of Senators Hatch
and Kennedy, the Senators stated that the jurisdictional element requires
that each regulated burden on religious exercise affect interstate
commerce.
275
This limitation in the RLUIPA should be compared with the
acceptable jurisdictional element in Bass.276 In that case, the government
had to prove that the firearm in question had previously traveled
interstate, was moving interstate, was on an interstate facility at the time
of the offense, or its possession affected commerce.277 Perhaps with the
exception of the last, it is relatively easy for the government to make
these factual determinations.
In contrast, the limiting language in the RLUIPA does not lend itself
to a case-by-case inquiry. In each case in which the government alleges a
violation of the RLUIPA, it has the duty to demonstrate what effect the
land use regulation at issue has on interstate commerce.278 Unlike tracing
the origin of a gun, it is much more difficult to demonstrate with specific,
non-speculative data that each conflict between religion and a land use
regulation has interstate commerce effects.2 79 For example, in a case in
which a church is unable to construct a facility due to a land use
regulation, the government may argue that the regulation results in a
decrease in the demand for labor or supplies. 20 To satisfy the
jurisdictional element, the government would have to employ the
reasoning the Court rejected in Lopez and Morrison of "piling inference
upon inference" to reach the further conclusion that the church intended
273. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
274. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (2000).
275. 146 CONG. REc. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (exhibit 1).
276. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-51 (1971).
277. Id.
278. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
279. See supra Part IV.B.2.
280. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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to use out of state labor or supplies originating from out of state.28' Thus,
the purpose of the RLUIPA's jurisdictional element is compromised by
the difficulty a local government would face in making this
determination. Although Congress included a jurisdictional element in
the RLUIPA, courts would find it unhelpful in ensuring that only
activities that have interstate effects are regulated by the statute. Without
a valid jurisdictional element, there is no added assurance that a statute is
limited in scope.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress's third attempt at protecting religious liberty through the
RLUIPA fails to adequately invoke the Commerce Clause power. This
result might have been different had the U.S. Supreme Court adhered to
its pre-Lopez approach to the Commerce Clause. However, the Court's
current approach represents a return to the formulistic, restrictive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause between 1888 and 1937. Thus,
the RLUIPA is unconstitutional under the Court's current interpretation
of the Commerce Clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court's relatively recent addition of the "economic
activity" test substantially narrows Congress's regulatory powers under
the Commerce Clause. Only an activity involving an economic enterprise
and commercial transactions satisfies the Court's test. This reveals a
critical defect of the RLUIPA: land use regulation does not constitute an
economic enterprise or transaction as defined by the U.S. Supreme
Court.
However, even if a court were to determine that land use regulation
constitutes economic activity, Congress did not satisfy the elements the
U.S. Supreme Court established to ensure that the statute regulates only
those activities that affect interstate commerce. Most significantly, courts
should be concerned that approving the RLUIPA would open the door
for Congress to completely usurp local government authority over its
land use. Therefore, Congress's latest attempt at protecting religious
liberty will be frustrated by limitations on the Commerce Clause power
imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
281. See supra Part IV.B.2. It might be possible for a party to meet this burden under certain
specific fact patterns. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
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